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|-----------------------|--|--|---|--|
| 6 7 | Attorneys for Plaintiff AFSCME LOCAL 101 | | | |
| 8 | · · · · · | | | |
| 9 | SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA | | | |
| 0 | IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA | | | |
| 1 | AT SA | AT SAN JOSÉ | | |
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| 3 | SAN JOSE POLICE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION, | Consolidated Case No | | |
| 4 | Plaintiff, | [Consolidated with Ca 1-12-CV-226570, 1-12 1-12-CV-227864, and | | |
| 5 | V. | Assigned For All Pu | | |
| 6 | CITY OF SAN JOSÉ, BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION FOR POLICE AND FIRE | JUDGE PATRICIA LUCA DEPARTMENT 2 | ,s | |
| 7 | DEPARTMENT RETIREMENT PLAN OF CITY OF SAN JOSE, and DOES 1-10, | | 91'S OPPOSITION TO | |
| 8 | inclusive, Defendants. | MOTION IN LIMIN | E'S SUPPLEMENTAL IE TO EXCLUDE SES CAROL GARCIA | |
| 20 | | AND PEGGY HORN TESTIFYING AT TI | NING FROM | |
| 1 | | | | |
| 2 | | Hearing Date: Hearing Time: | July 19, 2013 9:00 a.m. | |
| .3 | | Courtroom: Judge: | 2 Hon. Patricia Lucas | |
| 4 | | Complaint Filed: Trial Date: | July 5, 2012 June 22, 2013 | |
| 5 | AND RELATED CROSS-COMPLAINT AND CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS | | | |
| 3 | AFSCME LOCAL 101'S OPPOSITION TO CITY OF SAN JO | | 350681.doc | |

MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE AFSCME WITNESSES CAROL GARCIA AND

PEGGY HORNING FROM TESTIFYING AT TRIAL

Consolidated Case No. 112CV225926

I. INTRODUCTION

Through its Motion in Limine ("Motion"), the City of San José ("City") moves to exclude proposed trial witnesses Carol Garcia and Peggy Horning ("witnesses") from testifying at trial because, according to the City, "AFSCME has refused to timely produce them for deposition."

First, the City's Motion should be rejected because it is untimely pursuant to the terms of the Court's April 23, 2013 Order ("Order"), as reaffirmed in the parties' "Stipulation and [Proposed] Order Regarding Schedules for Motions in Limine Relating to Expert Witnesses," filed with the Court around June 27, 2013 ("Supplemental Stipulation").

Furthermore, the City cites to two inapplicable cases to support its argument, *Thoren v. Johnston & Washer* (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 270 and *Deeter v. Angus* (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 241, and misrepresents these narrow holdings. Rather, the City's motion is contrary to law. (See *Saxena v. Goffney* (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316.) The City is simply not entitled to the evidence sanction of precluding a witness from testifying based on asserted dissatisfaction with the dates on which the witnesses are available for deposition. The City has failed to provide any proper authority to support the extreme sanctions sought through this Motion.

The City also argues that AFSCME Local 101's ("AFSCME") proposed trial witnesses should be excluded from testifying at trial because "AFSCME's refusal to timely produce Ms. Garcia and Ms. Horning violates this Court's April 23, 2013 Order...." This argument is equally unavailing, as the aforementioned Court Order ("Order") only requires that the witnesses be made available for deposition when requested, and AFSCME has offered to do so. The fact that the City is not agreeable to the options presented for deposition does not characterize AFSCME's actions as a "refusal." Therefore, this Motion should be denied in whole.

Finally, the City can show no prejudice for its decision not to depose these witnesses within the timeframe they are available, because AFSCME has provided to the City the pre-trial declarations of the witnesses' proffered testimony, as contemplated and set forth in the Pre-Trial Order (and upon which they may be cross-examined at trial). The City has not indicated its willingness to permit the declarations to be used in lieu of testimony at trial, and it now seeks to unfairly and prejudicially

exclude the testimony.

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For these reasons, as more fully described below, the motion should be denied.

The Order specifies that by June 27, 2013, all motions in limine ("MIL") were to be filed and

Both witnesses subject to this Motion are lay witnesses. As the City acknowledges in page 1

Had the City immediately attempted to meet and confer with counsel with respect to counsel's

1) The City would have learned of counsel's and Ms. Horning's limited availability in advance

2) The City would have learned of Ms. Garcia's lengthy period of unavailability and could have

At that time, if the City was still unable to secure mutually agreeable deposition dates for the

noticed her deposition prior to June 28--given the fact that it learned of AFSCME's intent to

served. The Supplemental Stipulation, adjusted the dates for filing motions in limine with respect to

expert witness testimony; specifically stated that the "deadlines for motions in limine unrelated to

expert witness testimony shall remain the same as those specified in the April 24, 2013 [Order]."

(Soroushian Decl., ¶ 8, Exh. 4.) The City signed the Supplemental Stipulation on June 26, 2013, a

of its Motion, the City was informed that AFSCME intends to call the witnesses to testify at trial on

Thursday, June 20, 2013, an entire week before the MIL deadline. In addition, declarations of the

witnesses' proffered testimony were served on the City at that time. Knowing this, the City waited

four days to notice the depositions of these witnesses without first consulting with AFSCME's

counsel ("counsel) with respect to counsel's availability or that of the witnesses.

availability and that of the witnesses, several things would have happened:

call her as a witness eight days prior to her planned departure.

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II. ARGUMENT

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A. The Motion is Untimely

day prior to the aforementioned June 27th deadline.

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The relevant language is found on lines 16-17 of page 4.

A copy of this Order constitutes Exhibit A of the Declaration of Michael C. Hughes' in support of the City's Motion.

AFSCME LOCAL 101'S OPPOSITION TO CITY OF SAN JOSE'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE AFSCME WITNESSES CAROL GARCIA AND PEGGY HORNING FROM TESTIFYING AT TRIAL

Consolidated Case No. 112CV225926

witnesses, it could have either:

- 1) Asked for a stipulation to extend the time to file such a motion--the Supplemental Stipulation is an example of how that has already occurred in this case,
- 2) Sought leave of Court to file motions in limine beyond the June 27th deadline had the parties not agreed to such a stipulation, which would have been unlikely, or
- 3) Had enough time to file this instant Motion by the June 27th deadline.

AFSCME should not be faulted because the City failed to consult with it before noticing theses depositions and failed to comply with the mutually agreed upon deadlines set forth in the Order and Supplemental Stipulation; therefore, this Motion should be denied.

B. The City Misrepresents the Holdings in the Cases it Cites and the Cases Are Inapposite

The City cites to two cases to support its argument, Thoren v. Johnston & Washer (1972) 29

Cal.App.3d 270 and Deeter v. Angus (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 241, but does not correctly describe the narrow holdings of these cases. The City's Motion is contrary to law. (See Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316.) The City is simply not entitled to the evidence sanction of precluding a witness from testifying based on an asserted dissatisfaction with the availability for deposition of said witnesses.

In *Thoren* and *Deeter*, the appellate courts upheld the trial court's exclusion of evidence based on a finding that a party *willfully concealed* its existence in response to interrogatories. (See *Thoren*, 29 Cal.App.3d at 274-275, *Deeter*, 179 Cal.App.3d at 254.) In *Thoren*, in response to an interrogatory seeking the identification of witnesses who observed the scene of the injury, the party knowingly failed to identify a witness and identified that witness for the first time in its opening statement at trial after a jury had been empaneled.² Importantly, in both cases, the opposing party was unaware of the existence of the concealed evidence and, therefore, could not seek to compel it. The *Thoren* court explained that excluding the evidence in that case was warranted because "a willfully false response ... subjects the adversary to unfair surprise at trial." (*Id.* at 274.) The City erroneously asserts that

² In *Deeter*, the party failed to produce in response to a request for production and concealed in response to an interrogatory the existence of a tape that it sought to introduce at trial. *Deeter* simply does not address the issue of exclusion of a witness from trial.

these cases hold that "[i]f information is requested in discovery and not provided, that information cannot be offered into evidence at trial." (Motion, p. 1.) This is not the holding of *Thoren* nor *Deeter*.

In Saxena v. Goffney, the court explained that the Thoren holding is "narrow" and "covering a circumstance not specifically dealt with in the Civil Discovery Act." (159 Cal.App.4th at p. 334.) The exclusionary remedy in the Thoren case is limited to situations where a party willfully and falsely conceals a witness's name in response to discovery and, thereby, subjects the adversary to unfair surprise. (Saxena, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 332 (citations omitted); see also Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal. App. 4th 1315, 1325 (overturning exclusion of a witness who was not identified in discovery responses and reasoning that, "Thoren provides authority for excluding evidence based on a willfully false discovery response.").

Here AFSCME properly disclosed the witnesses, and even provided a declaration of their anticipated testimony, in the hope that it would be accepted for use at trial (Under the joint stipulation, the parties may offer witnesses to testify via declaration and, if accepted, the witnesses do not count towards the number of witnesses each party is permitted to call at trial. Thus far, the City has failed to accept a single of the six declarations proffered by Plaintiffs, and as such, it is doubtful whether these limitations set forth in the stipulation will enable a full trial within the time allotted by the Court).

C. Saxena Controls and Forecloses the City's Motion

The Saxena court went on to hold that for "evasive or incomplete discovery responses . . . imposition of an evidence sanction is not one of the remedies." (Saxena, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 334.)

The Saxena court reasoned that the Civil Discovery Act (§ 2016.010 et seq.) provides specific remedies for evasive or incomplete discovery responses: a motion to compel. Thus, in the absence of a violation of an order compelling attendance at a deposition, the evidence sanction of exclusion may only be imposed where a party willfully and falsely conceals a witness' identity. The simple failure to accommodate the City's schedule, based on its one-sided and unsupported interpretation of the Order, requires it to pursue an order compelling the attendance of said witnesses at deposition at a time it sees fit—otherwise the right to an answer or further answer is waived and an evidence sanction is not

available. (Id.) In fact, the Civil Discovery Act provides the City with the procedural tools with which to compel the witness' attendance at deposition, if it believes that such is necessary. (See Code Civ. P. § 2025.450.) "[T]he burden is on the propounding party to enforce discovery. Otherwise, no penalty attaches either for the responding party's failure to respond or responding inadequately." (Saxena, 159 Cal. App. 4th at p. 334.)

Here, the City acknowledged that AFSCME disclosed the witnesses' identities as potential trial witnesses as required by the Court's Order. (Motion, p. 1.) Therefore, it fails to identify any willful and false concealment of the witness' identifies, as is required for exclusion pursuant to Thoren. Because AFSCME provided the City with the Declarations of both Carol Garcia and Peggy Horning outlining their expected trial testimonies, so the City is already aware of not just the witness identities but their anticipated trial testimony obviating any claim of "unfair surprise at trial at trial." (See Soroushian Decl., ¶¶ 2-3, Exh. 1 ("Decl. Carol Garcia"); Exh. 2 ("Decl. of Peggy Horning".) In fact, pursuant to the Order, the City has the additional option of accepting these declarations as trial testimony subject to their objections, filing counter-declarations, and/or cross-examining said witnesses at trial. Given such options, it is disingenuous for the City to cry lack of "basic fairness".

Critically, AFSCME has not "refused" to produce either witness for deposition. As the City acknowledges, AFSCME provided several dates on which Ms. Horning was available for deposition. If, after the requisite meet and confer, the City was unsatisfied with the witness availability, it carried the burden of filing motions to compel their attendance at deposition at different times. Ms. Garcia is on a two-week vacation out of the area and simply unavailable to attend a deposition until July 18, when she returns. Plaintiffs have offered to make her available at any time, including weekends, after her return.

In light of Saxena, this motion in limine is unauthorized by law. Under California law, upon the refusal of the deponent to answer a question, the burden is upon the party seeking discovery to obtain an order from the superior court to compel disclosure. (See Saxena, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 334.) The City's attempt to skirt that responsibility, by way of this Motion, is unsupported by law.

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California law permits a party to move to exclude the "expert opinion of any witness that is

D. There is No Legal Basis to Exclude Witness' Testimony

offered by any party who has unreasonably failed to ... [m]ake that expert available for a deposition" (Code Civ. P. § 2034.300 (emphasis added).) However, the witnesses at issue in this Motion are not experts and will not offer expert opinions at trial. (See Soroushian Decl., ¶¶ 2-3, Exh. 1 ("Decl. Carol Garcia"); Exh. 2 ("Decl. of Peggy Horning"). Moreover, AFSCME has not "unreasonably failed to ... make them available for deposition" AFSCME has continued to offer Ms. Garcia for deposition after she returns from vacation on July 19, 2013, including over the weekend. (See Soroushian Decl., ¶¶ 5-6, Exh. 3 (Letter to Mike Hughes).) Furthermore, as the City acknowledged in its Motion, AFSCME identified several dates for Ms. Horning to appear for deposition; the City appears to reject these overtures on the sole grounds that it believes these dates are too close to trial. However, it cites no authority for the proposition that a witness' availability for deposition in the week prior to trial amounts to an "unreasonable" failure to make that witness available for deposition. If anything, this only amounts to a failure to make the witnesses available for deposition at a time that is convenient for the City.

The City has failed to identify any analogous authority justifying the exclusion of *lay* witness testimony under these circumstances; in fact, none exists. It must be presumed that the Legislature's failure to provide for such a remedy with respect to lay witness testimony was purposeful when it provided such with respect to expert witness testimony. (Cf. *Pasadena Police Officers Ass'n v. Pasadena* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564, 576.) Therefore, the City fails to demonstrate any grounds for excluding Ms. Garcia or Ms. Horning from testifying at trial.

E. The Court Order Does Not Support the Remedy Sought and AFSCME Has Not Violated It
In a single sentence, the City contends that "AFSCME's refusal to timely produce Ms. Garcia
and Ms. Horning violates th[e] ... Order (requiring parties to produce witness "as requested") and is
objectionable on that basis as well." The City's one-sentence argument mischaracterizes the Court's

³ AFSCME, of course, will also be preparing the week before trial. Although defending a deposition the week before trial takes away from AFSCME's counsel's time to prepare, AFSCME has offered to do so. 7

| 1 | Order and AFSCME's action with respect to it. The Order only requires that AFSCME make | | | | |
|----|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | witnesses available for deposition when requested to do so by the City; it does not require that | | | | |
| 3 | AFSCME produce the witnesses for deposition on the date demanded by the City. AFSCME has | | | | |
| 4 | fulfilled its responsibility under the Order by providing the City with dates on which the witnesses | | | | |
| 5 | can be deposed. The City's dissatisfaction with witness availability does not constitute a violation of | | | | |
| 6 | the Order and justify the sanctions soughtwhich are also not authorized by the Order. | | | | |
| 7 | III. <u>CONCLUSION</u> | | | | |
| 8 | For the foregoing reasons, the Motion should be denied. | | | | |
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| 11 | DEEGON TAVED & DODDIE ABO | | | | |
| 12 | Dated: July 8, 2013 BEESON, TAYER & BODINE, APC. | | | | |
| 13 | By: Vishtap Sopoushian (by DSN) | | | | |
| 14 | VISHTASP M. SOROUSHIAN | | | | |
| 15 | Attorneys for AFSCME LOCAL 101 | | | | |
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PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

I declare that I am employed in the County of Alameda, State of California. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within cause. My business address is Beeson, Tayer & Bodine, Ross House, Suite 200, 483 Ninth Street, Oakland, California, 94607-4051. On this day, I served the foregoing Document(s):

AFSCME LOCAL 101'S OPPOSITION TO CITY OF SAN JOSE'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE AFSCME WITNESSES CAROL GARCIA AND PEGGY HORNING FROM TESTIFYING AT TRIAL

By UPS Overnight Delivery to the parties in said action, as addressed below, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §1013(c), by placing a true and correct copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope, with delivery fees prepaid or provided for, in a designated outgoing overnight mail. Mail placed in that designated area is picked up that same day, in the ordinary course of business for delivery the following day via United Parcel Service Overnight Delivery.

Arthur A. Hartinger, Esq. Jennifer L. Nock, Esq. Linda M. Ross, Esq. Michael C. Hughes MEYERS, NAVE, RIBACK, SILVER & WILSON 555 12th Street, Suite I 500 Oakland, CA 94607

Attorneys for Defendants, THE CITY OF SAN JOSE AND DEBRA FIGONE

By Mail to the parties in said action, as addressed below, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §1013(a), by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope in a designated area for outgoing mail, addressed as set forth below. I am readily familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.

SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Oakland, California, on this date, July 8, 2013.

Marlene T. Dunleavy

SERVICE LIST

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| 8 | Superior Court Cuse No. 112CV 2237207 | Necessary Party in Interest, THE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE 1961 SAN JOSE | |
| 9 | | POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENT RETIREMENT PLAN (Santa Clara Superior | |
| 10 | | Court Case No. 112CV225928) AND | |
| 11 | | Necessary Party in Interest, THE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE 1975 | |
| 12 | | FEDERATED CITY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT PLAN (Santa Clara Superior | |
| 13 | | Court Case Nos. 112CV226570 and 112CV22574) | |
| 14 | | AND Necessary Party in Interest, THE BOARD OF | |
| 15 | · | ADMINISTRATION FOR THE FEDERATED CITY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT PLAN | |
| 16 | | (Santa Clara Superior Court Case No. 112CV227864) | |
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| 23 | AND Plaintiffs/Petitioners, JOHN MUKHAR, DALE | OLSON, GARY J. RICHERT and ROSALINDA NAVARRO (Santa Clara Superior Court Case | |
| 24 | DAPP, JAMES ATKINS, WILLIAM BUFFINGTON AND KIRK PENNINGTON (Santa | No. 112CV233660) | |
| 25 | Clara Superior Court Case No. 112-CV-226574) AND | | |
| 26 | Plaintiffs/Petitioners, TERESA HARRIS, JON REGER, MOSES SERRANO (Santa Clara | | |
| 27 | Superior Court Case No. 112-CV-226570) | | |
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AFSCME LOCAL 101'S OPPOSITION TO CITY OF SAN JOSE'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE AFSCME WITNESSES CAROL GARCIA AND PEGGY HORNING FROM TESTIFYING AT TRIAL Consolidated Case No. 112CV225926

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